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2Introduction
According to many observers of Russian politics, the 1996 presidential election, in which
Gennady Zyuganov won 43 percent of the popular vote in the second round against Boris
Yeltsin, was in all likelihood the “last hurrah” of the Communist Party of the Russian
Federation. The reason for erroneous view was simple: support for the party was
concentrated among elderly pensioners, while support for political and economic reform
was strongest among the younger cohorts of voters. According to Vyacheslav Nikonov, a
leading analyst of Russian politics, the communists were a dying breed: “There is no
correlation between living conditions and the communist vote. The correlation is age”
(quoted by Lally 1997).
A substantial body of survey data backed up Nikonov’s assessment. In interviews
conducted in the waning years of the Soviet Union, Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) report
finding that elderly respondents (those over age 60) were far less supportive than those in
younger age groups of the basic tenets of political and economic reform. They were less
likely to see the value of competitive elections and freedom of speech, less likely to assign
responsibility for one’s well-being to the individual rather than the state, and less tolerant
of income disparities.1  Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger (1994), similarly, reported that in a
series of surveys conducted between 1990 and 1992, elderly Russians were considerably
more likely to agree that an orderly society took precedence over individual freedom, that
Stalin was not being given enough credit for building socialism, and that political reform in
Russia was advancing too rapidly. Similar findings abound, including those of Bahry
(1993) and Reisinger et al. (1994).
To most Westerners it seems surprising that elderly Russians are so much more supportive
of the communists, in that it was this generation that directly suffered the calamities
wrought by Stalinism.  There are two major explanations that are usually given as to why
this is nevertheless the case. First, during the early, formative years of their life, the
currently elderly were subject not only to the horrors of totalitarianism but also to
“totalitarian socialization” (Gibson 1996). In the world in which they grew up, it was the
3Communist Party, unerringly directed by Comrade Stalin, that brought about rapid
industrialization, victory in the Great Patriotic War, and Sputnik. This explanation thus
posits a generational effect, as it is understood in cohort analysis. A similar phenomenon in
this country is the association of Franklin Roosevelt and the Democratic Party with ending
the Great Depression. Voters who entered the electorate at about this time, the “New
Deal” Democrats, remained disproportionately supportive of the party over the course of
their entire lifetimes (Andersen 1979).
The second major explanation was that elderly pensioners were badly injured by the
reforms that ended the communist regime. In particular, the extremely high rates of
inflation that occurred in 1992-94 effectively wiped out their retirement savings.
Pensioners also experienced a degradation in medical care and other support services. This
resulted not only from cuts in direct government expenditures, but also from the desire of
newly privatized enterprises with newly enshrined profit motives to minimize social
welfare expenditures on current and former employees. To be sure, retirement in the
Soviet Union was never to be confused with that experienced in places like Ft.
Lauderdale, Florida, but it did afford a certain modicum of security.  But with the
affluence of the New Russians there has also come the New Poor—the elderly pensioners
one sees on the streets of Russian cities, selling off their belongings to help make ends
meet (Varoli 1996).
As noted frequently in the Western news media, life expectancy in Russia, which was
never all that high to begin with, fell dramatically in the 1990s, particularly among males.
Table 1, taken from Hough, Davidheiser, and Lehmann (1996) reports mortality rates for
various age cohorts of Russian men and women for the years between 1990 and 1994.  As
these data indicate, mortality rates for all cohorts rose, but the sharpest increases were
among Russian men over the age of 60. Based upon these figures, we can estimate that
roughly one fifth of the voters who were pensioners at the time of the 1991 presidential
election had died by the time of the 1996 election.
4Table 1 about here
The supporters of reform would thus seem to have time very much on their side. Granted,
the transition to a more market-oriented economy may have cost millions of casualties
among the elderly, but there are fewer of them today than there were yesterday, and there
will be fewer tomorrow than there are today.  In a recent prognosis on the future of
Russian politics, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott (1997 put it this way:
Perhaps the most significant and hopeful statistic I’ve seen: although 65% of those
Russians over the age of 65 think things got worse over the last year, 60% of those under
35 think things got better. So among the positive trends underway in Russia is perhaps the
most basic of all, the one represented by the actuarial tables.
The 1999 Duma election and the 2000 presidential election in Russia came as a perfect
tool to test the validity of this scenario. Indeed, as numbers in Table 2 show only about
50% of those receiving pensions in 1990 got to live long enough to see Boris Yeltsin
resign and to participate in the latest election cycle.
Table 2 is about here
Thus, if Talbott’s prediction was correct then the support for the communist party in 1999
and their leader Zuganov in 2000 should have dropped by the same factor. However, the
election results suggest the opposite. In December of 1999, approximately 30% of voters
cast their ballots for the CPRF and their closest allies (“Communists for the USSR”,
“Stalin’s Block” etc). This is almost identical to what they had gotten in December of
1995 (approx. 28% of the vote). Genadii Zuganov received 30.2% of the popular vote in
March of 2000, compared to 32% support he enjoyed in the first round of the 1996
presidential elections. It is clear that those who hoped for the disappearence of the “reds”
in the mortuaries got it wrong. But the question about the nature, source and the future of
the support for the communist party remains open. An attempt to answer  this question
naturally leads us to two competing hypothesis:
5H1: The CPRF voters are widely distributed among various population groups, and the
party’s support is not related to a voter’s age or social status.
H2:  Most of its support CPRF receives from pensioners and elderly people. “New”
pensioners start voting communist as soon as they enter that age group, even though they
might have voted otherwise before.
If the first hypothesis holds then it implies Russian voters cast their ballots one way or
another depending upon their approval or disapproval of the consequences that market
reforms bring them, now and in the future. Support for continuing reform would thus
depend upon the extent to which reforms are actually successful in improving economic
conditions in general, and not just in redistributing resources to the young from the old.
On the other hand if the second hypothesis is correct then it suggests that the CPRF is
very successful in attracting new voters, and might remain a serious political force for
years to come no matter what the government is doing against it.
Analysis
In order to get some purchase on this question we have undertaken an analysis that
compares the size and nature of the “pensioner” vote in the 1991, 1996  and 2000
presidential elections. This analysis is based upon voting returns and demographic data,
aggregated at the rayon level2  and consists of two major parts: comparison of 1991/1996
(part 1) and 1996/2000 (part 2) returns. Although we do not have observations from all
rayons, we do have, as shown in Table 3, an entirely adequate and representative sample
of 1436 rayons distributed across all major economic and political subdivisions of the
country.
Table 3 about here
6The most straightforward way in which to test the hypothesis that support for the
communists is literally dying out would be to regress change (between 1991 and 1996,
and, then between 1996 and 2000) in the percentage of votes going to the communist
candidate upon change in the percentage of pensioners in each rayon.  The relative
performance of the communists would be expected to decline in those rayons that lost the
largest number of pensioners. This turned out not to be feasible, because in most rayons
the percentage of pensioners changed very little over this ten-year period. It is hard to
explain variance in the dependent variable with an independent variable that has little
variance.
There is, however, another estimation strategy available. As indicated earlier, by our
estimates roughly one-fifth of those who were pensioners in 1991 were gone by 1996 and
about one-halve were gone by the year 2000. To the extent they were replaced by
individuals from a younger, less Stalinist cohort, we would expect support for the
communists in this category of voters to be diluted. We can thus estimate an equation of
the following form:
where:
y1 = the percentage of vote won by the communist candidate in each rayon in the first
presidential election (1991/1996).
y2  = the percentage of vote won by the communist candidate in each rayon the second
presidential election (1996/2000).
X1 = the percentage of pensioners in each rayon in the first presidential election year.
X2 = the percentage of pensioners in each rayon in the second presidential election year.
In the first part of our analyis we call the 1991 and 1996 as “first” and “second” election
respectively. In the second part of the analysis we call the 1996 and 2000 elections as the
“first” one and the “second” one. If support for the communists among pensioners was
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7diluted between the first and the second elections, then in the manner described above, we
would expect the coefficient for the pensioner vote in the second election relative to that
in the first (B2 – B1) to be negative. In order to properly specify this equation we need to
also estimate the cross-the-board changes in support for the communist candidate between
the two elections. We thus specify a dummy variable for observations made in the second
election, in addition to a constant term. We also specify dummy variables for each of the
48 regions and republics from which the rayons in our sample are drawn. This is necessary
because of the substantial regional variation in support for the communist party.
Another complication we need to address derives from the fact that there were three major
candidates in the 1991 presidential election—Boris Yeltsin, the communist candidate
Nikolai Ryzhkov, and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, - two rounds in the 1996 presidential election
and only one round in the 2000 presidential election.  Rather than speculate as to the best
way to specify the dependent variable, we thought a preferable strategy would be to run
the regression on several different permutations.  To the extent our results do not vary
with the way we specify the dependent variable, we can be confident in their robustness. It
should be noted that in some of these equations the dependent variable is pro-Yeltsin, and
thus our expectations about the signs of the coefficients would be reversed.
 At any rate, we used the following pairs of votes in the first part of the analysis: (1) for
Ryzhkov in 1991, for Zyuganov in the first round of 1996; (2) for Ryzhkov in 1991, for
Zyuganov in the second round of 1996; (3) for all candidates other than Yeltsin in 1991,
for Zyuganov in the first round of 1996; (4) for Yeltsin in 1991, for Yeltsin in the first
round of 1996; (5) for Yeltsin in 1991, for Yeltsin in the second round of 1996; (6) for
Yeltsin in 1991, for Yeltsin or Lebed in the first round of 1996.  Also, simply out of
curiosity we ran the regression using Zhirinovsky’s votes in 1991  and in the first round of
1996.
In the second part of the analysis the following pairs ov votes have been used: (1) for
Zuganov in the first round in 1996, for Zuganov in 2000; (2) for all candidates other than
8Yeltsin  in 1996 first round, for Zuganov in 2000; (3) for Yeltsin in the first round of the
1996, for Putin in 2000,.
Results of  the 1991/1996 part of our regression analyses are reported in Table 4.  The top
number in each entry is the regression coefficient, the bottom number the standard error.
Note also that coefficients associated with the 48 regional dummy variables are not
reported. Looking first at the coefficients associated with the pensioner vote in the 1991
election, we see that this category of voters was quite supportive of  Ryzhkov and
correspondingly unsupportive of Yeltsin. This is exactly what the findings from the survey
data discussed previously would have portended. But contrary to the hypothesis that
pensioners’ support for the communists had become diluted over the intervening five
years, we see that the elderly were actually far more supportive of the communist
candidate in 1996 than they had been previously.  Clustered around .5, the coefficients we
estimated in the first three equations for the “pensioners, second election” term must be
added to the coefficients of the “pensioners, first round” term (which average about .3) to
gauge their effect. Our results thus indicate that an increase of one in the percentage of
pensioners in a rayon would lead to a .8 percent increase in the percentage of votes won
by Zyuganov..  Support for the communists among Russian pensioners thus became more
concentrated, not diluted.
Table 4 about here
Turning to the other equations reported in Table 4, we see that the coefficients in the
Yeltsin equations are smaller, but still sizable. They thus indicate that pensioners’
opposition to Yeltsin, while already quite strong in 1991, was much stronger in 1996. We
can thus be confident that our results do not depend upon any particular specification of
the dependent variable. Finally, we see that although pensioners were somewhat more
supportive of Zhirinovsky in 1991, by 1996 they were no more likely than younger cohorts
of Russians to vote for him.
Results of the 1996/2000 part of the analysis are reported in Table 5. It is not surprising
that the first row of coefficients is roughly similar to the sum of the first and second rows
9in Table 4. These coefficients show pensioners’ support for a particular candidate in the
1996 election. It is interesting to note that the much smaller coefficients in the second row
do not turn opposite to the coefficients in the first row. This indicates that pensioners as a
group stayed loyal to the communist party despite large degree of “rotation” within their
(pensioners) ranks. Table 5 also shows that Putin did not enjoy much of  support from the
elderly. This is somewhat similar to Yeltsin’s situation in 1991 and 1996.   Finally, it is
interesting to note that Yeltsin’s 1996 voters did not go “all as one” to Vladimir Putin,
implying that Putin must have gotten most of his votes from “elsewhere”.
Table 5 about here
Discussion
“Pensioners are paid very little, but at least they get something…Nobody notices us.”
---Nina Matskevich, 49-year-old unemployed accountant
The most ready explanation of our findings, which run utterly counter to the dilution
hypothesis, involves timing: while Russian pensioners tended to oppose Yeltsin in 1991
because of their apprehension over the political and economic reforms he was promoting,
they strongly opposed him in 1996 because by then they had experienced the severe,
economic dislocations the reforms engendered, and they kept voting communist in 2000
for the reason that the government did not improve their lives.  There is surely some truth
to this, but we doubt that it is the full story. First, the regression equations we estimated
included a dummy variable for the 1996 (2000) election, which should have registered
across-the-board changes in support for the communists and opposition to Yeltsin (Putin).
The pensioner variables thus register effects over and above the nation-wide swing, and so
this interpretation would imply that pensioners were especially hard hit.
According to our reading of the situation, however, this was not the case. The pensions
Russians receive are certainly quite modest, but payments have been indexed to inflation
and are probably not much lower in real terms than they were when the reforms began.
Although whatever savings they might have had in Sberbank were wiped out, most
Russians have long kept much of their savings in other forms.  They also received title to
10
their apartments; given the high property values of Moscow and other major cities, this
means that they would experience a windfall profit were they to sell their apartment.  This
is not meant to minimize the very difficult material conditions under which many elderly
Russians live, but only to note, as Varoli (1996) reports, that “Their plight is not as severe
as portrayed by the mass media” (p. 11).
In our view, it was not pensioners, but rather Russian workers who were approaching
retirement who were disproportionately injured by the transition to a more market-
oriented economy. They, too, suffered the loss of savings, but in many cases they also lost
their jobs.  Although many such workers remain on the company payroll, there is in fact
no work for them and they are infrequently paid. Unlike younger workers, they simply
lack the time to learn the new skills and new habits that the economy now calls for.
Between the three presidential elections, then, those who had been pensioners in 1991
were joined by large numbers of new pensioners who had suffered badly during the final
years of their working lives. While not officially counted as unemployed, they in fact had
no work and received little pay. For such people, becoming old enough to receive a
pension actually marked an improvement in their material conditions. As retrospective
economic voters, they thus strongly supported Zyuganov in 1996 and 2000. In short, the
“new” pensioners who entered this category between 1991 and 1996 were substantially
more supportive of the communists than those who had died. That support remained intact
between 1996 and 2000 presidential campaigns.
We therefore think the second hypothesis holds as  a much more probable one. This is
probably a pretty good news for Genadii Zuganov and co. According to data on the age
structure of the Russian population, there are many millions of people over fifty years old
and thus too old to smoothly transition to the ways of the new economy. Support for the
communists is concentrated among the old, but this will remain a very large category of
voters for many years to come.
11
Endnotes
1. The category of  “elderly” needs to be adjusted downward in a country in which
normal retirement age for women has long been 55, 60 for men, and where current
male life expectancy is about 58.
2. We are indebted to Sergei Beriozkin and to the late Alexandr Sobianin for making
these data available to us.
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Table 1.  Mortality Rates in Russia per 1,000 Population, by Age
and Gender, 1990-94
Age 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Men
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
7.6
11.7
16.1
23.4
34.2
48.0
8.0
11.6
16.6
23.3
34.6
47.3
9.8
13.8
19.4
25.3
36.9
49.4
13.3
17.8
26.3
31.3
46.3
59.4
15.2
20.8
29.1
38.2
61.0
64.0
Women
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
2.4
3.8
5.4
8.6
13.5
22.0
2.6
3.8
6.6
8.6
13.6
22.0
2.8
4.2
8.1
9.1
14.4
22.6
3.7
6.4
7.9
10.9
16.7
26.6
4.2
8.2
8.0
12.3
18.4
27.1
           Source: Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow: Groskomstat, 1996), p. 33.
           (Reprinted in Hough, et al., p. 94.)
2Table 2. Distribution of Russian population by age and gender 1989-1999
(in thousands of people)
1989 1999
Age Total Males Females Total Males Females
0-6
16814 8559 8254 9646 4950 4696
7-15
19181 9729 9451 20688 10551 10137
Males
16-59
Females
16-54
83746 43440  40306 85547 43999 41547
Males
60-
Females
55-
27195
6945 20249
30444
9109 21335
45-49 7954 3760 4187 11137 5335 5802
50-54 9593 4453 5139 6997 3264 3733
55-59 8399 3719 4679 7094 3091 4003
60-64 8360 3239 5120 8105 3391 4713
65-69 4510 1367 3142 6609 2529 4080
70-74 2652 1011 2641 5935 1903 4031
75-79 3333 819 2513 2812 682 2130
80-84 1769 364 1405 1635 345 1289
85 - 890 143 746 1343 256 1086
Source: Socialno-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossiiin 1999 (Moscow: Groskomstat,
2000), p. 28.
2n the sample
Central
Moscow 33
Briansk 31
Vladmir 26
Vanovo 26
 Kaluga  26
Kostroma 24
Orel 26
 Riazan  27
Smolensk 26
Tver 38
Tula 17
Yaroslavl 18
Central-"Black Soil"
Belgorod 26
Voronezh 37
Kursk 30
 Lipetsk  19
Northwestern
St. Petersburgh Region 17
Pskov 26
Northern
Arkhangelsk 23
Vologda 28
Murmansk 14
Karelia Republic 18
Komi Republic 19
Volga
Astrakhan 10
Volgograd 38
Penza 32
Samara 34
Saratov 47
Ulianovsk 23
Kalmikia Republic 14
Volga-Viatka
Kirovsk           35  Mari-
El Republic 17
Mordovia Republic 23
Chuvashia Republic 25
Northern Caucasus
Adygeiya Republic   8
Karachaevo-Cherkess Repbulic  9
Rostov 52
Kab. Balkar. Republic 11
North-Ossetia   8
Ingushetia Republic   1
Ural
Kurgan 24
Orenburg 45
Perm 35
Komi-Perm Autonomous Region 6
Sverdlovsk 54
Chelyabinsk 29
 Bashkiria                   63
Table 3.  Regional Breakdown of Rayon-Level Sample
Table 4.  Pensioners' Choices in Russian Presidential Elections, 1991-96
Variable Ryzhkov 91
Zyuganov 96-1
Ryzhkov 91
Zyuganov 96-2
Anti-Yeltsin 91
Zyuganov 96-1
Yeltsin 91
Yeltsin 96-1
Yeltsin 91
Yeltsin 96-2
Yeltsin 91
Yeltsin+Lebed 96-1
Zhirinovsky 91
Zhirinovsky 96-1
Constant 4.7
(2.1)
6.8
(2.0)
22.2
(2.5)
78.8
(2.2)
77.7
(2.4)
80.7
(2.3)
0.4
(0.6)
Second
Election
5.6
(.19)
11.3
(1.9)
-19.5
(2.3)
-9.5
(2.1)
13.3
(2.2)
4.9
(2.1)
0.6
(0.6)
Pensioners,
First Election
.29
(.05)
.19
(.05)
.28
(.06)
-.33
(.06)
-.28
(.06)
-.42
(.05)
.16
(.02)
Pensioners,
Second
Election
.45
(.06)
.55
(.06)
.52
(0.8)
-.22
(.07)
-.45
(.08)
-.23
(.07)
-.15
(.02)
R2(adj) .64 .74 .46 .59 .45 .46 .43
2Table 5.  Pensioners' Choices in Russian Presidential Elections, 1996-00
Variable Zyuganov 96-1
Zuganov 2000
Anti-Yeltsin 96
Zuganov 2000
Yeltsin 96-1
Putin 2000
Constant 5.2
(3.1)
17.8
(3.1)
83.2
(3.5)
Second
Election
1.4
(.46)
-15.3
(2.4)
17.5
(1.9)
Pensioners,
First Election
.81
(.11)
.77
(.7)
-.81
(.14)
Pensioners,
Second
Election
.03
(.004)
-.01
(.02)
.34
(0.1)
R2(adj) .73 .69 .38
